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THE "PLAIN FEEL" EXCEPTION IN MINNESOTA v.
DICKERSON: A FURTHER EROSION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,' a case further defining the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,2
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Fourth
Amendment permits the seizure of non-threatening contraband
detected by the sense of touch during a protective search for weap-
ons based on reasonable suspicion.3 The Court granted certiorari
in order to resolve a dispute among federal appellate courts and
several state appellate courts as to this issue.4 In this case, the
1. 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993).
2. The Fourth Amendment states: "[tihe right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As
Justice Brandeis stated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(dissenting), the Fourth Amendment "confer[s], as against the Government, the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1978);
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179-80
(1969); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1, 2 (1932); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886).
3. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct at 2133 (referring to the cursory "pat down" or frisk
for weapons as allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
4. Id. at 2134. For cases recognizing a "plain feel" or "plain touch corollary"
to the "plain view doctrine", see United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d
1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Russell,
655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981); People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96 (Cal. 1983);
Dickerson v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 12 (Del. Jan. 26, 1993); State v. Guy, 492
N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3020 (1993).
For courts which have refused to sanction this exception, see State v. Collins,
679 P.2d 80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1973); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d
1380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992); State v. Broadnax, 654
P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982).
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Court held that law enforcement officials may seize non-threaten-
ing contraband during the course of a lawful Terry "pat down" of a
suspect when they feel an object whose mass or contour makes its
identity as contraband immediately apparent. 5 In so holding, the
Court drew an analogy between the discovery of contraband dur-
ing a lawful Terry frisk and the discovery of contraband under the
"plain view" doctrine.6 The Court reasoned that if the object is
contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same
practical considerations that inhere in the "plain view" context.7
Yet, until this decision, pursuant to a warrantless search based on
reasonable suspicion, a law enforcement officer could seize only
weapons or other hard objects which he could reasonably have
believed to be a weapon.'
This Note will discuss the legal development of the "plain
feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment. It will reveal how the
Supreme Court in Dickerson used a combination of the Terry cur-
sory, "pat down" exception to the Fourth Amendment and the
"plain view" doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure.
It will examine the extent to which police officers may manipulate
lawful powers without overstepping the Amendment's safeguards.
Finally, this Note will describe how Dickerson's "plain feel" excep-
tion weakens Fourth Amendment guarantees and concludes it
could lead to an unwarranted invasion of the public's right to be
secure in their person.
THE CASE
On the night of November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis police
officers were patrolling Morgan Avenue. 9 At approximately 8:15
p.m., they observed defendant Timothy Dickerson leaving what
police described as a known "crack house."10 Upon making eye
contact with one officer, Dickerson immediately turned around
5. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2139.
6. Id. Earlier cases alluding. to a "plain view" exception to the Fourth
Amendment include Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) ("Objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.") and Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963).
7. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2134.
8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also United States v. Gonzalez,
763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting intrusion is unauthorized if true goal of
search is discovery or preservation of contraband rather than weapons).
9. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
10. Id.
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and began walking toward a side alley.11 Based upon Dickerson's
evasive actions and the fact he had just left a building known for
cocaine trafficking, the officers decided to investigate the situation
further. 12 The officers ordered Dickerson to stop and submit to a
"pat down" search for weapons.' 3 The search did not reveal any
weapons.'4 However, it did reveal a small lump in the front
pocket of Dickerson's nylon jacket.' 5 Upon reaching into Dicker-
son's pocket, the officer retrieved a small plastic bag containing
one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine.16 The officers then arrested
Dickerson and charged him with possession of a controlled sub-
stance.' 7 The officer testified at no time did he ever believe that
the small lump in Dickerson's jacket was a weapon.'
Prior to trial, Dickerson made a motion to suppress the crack
cocaine. 19 Relying on Terry, the trial court concluded the officers
were justified in stopping Dickerson to further investigate the pos-
sibility of criminal conduct.2 0 Also, the trial court found that the
frisk performed by the officer was justified to ensure the suspect
did not possess a weapon.2 ' Finally, by analogy to the "plain view"
doctrine, the court ruled that the officer's seizure of the crack
cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 2 With the court's
ruling of the cocaine admissible, the case proceeded to trial, where
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The officer later testified: "As I pat-searched the front of his body, I
felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and
it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2133-34.
18. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 481
N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992).
19. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2134.
20. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
21. Id.
22. Id. In its opinion, the trial court noted:
To this Court there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the
officer uses to conclude that the material is contraband. An experienced
officer may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing
the smell of burning marijuana in an automobile. The sound of a
shotgun being racked would clearly support certain reactions by an
officer. The sense of touch, grounded in experience and training, is as
reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. "Plain feel,".therefore,
is no different than plain view and will equally support the seizure here.
Dickerson, 113 S.Ct at 2134.
2591994]
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the court found Dickerson guilty of possession of a controlled su
bstance.2 3
Dickerson appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.24 The
appellate court agreed with the lower court by explaining the
investigative stop and protective "pat down" search were lawful
under Terry.25 However, the court of appeals refused to adopt the
"plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court con-
cluded the officers had overstepped the bounds allowed by Terry
in the conduct of the protective search.26
In affirming the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the validity of both the stop and frisk pursuant to
Terry and agreed that the seizure of the cocaine violated the
Fourth Amendment. In its decision, the court appeared to adopt
a categorical rule barring the admissibility of any non-threatening
contraband detected by a police officer's sense of touch during a
"pat down" search for weapons.28 The Minnesota Supreme Court
held if during the course of a "pat down" search for weapons, an
officer detects through the sense of touch an object which could
not possibly be a weapon, he is not entitled to go further with his
search in order to satisfy his curiosity as to what the object is.29
The Minnesota Court noted even if it did recognize a "plain feel"
exception to the Fourth Amendment, the search in this case would
not meet that exception because "the pat search of the defendant
went far beyond what is permissible under Terry."3°
Granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the Minnesota Court in holding the police officer in this case
23. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2134.
24. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 481
N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992).
25. Id. The court of appeals noted that the officers had a reasonable belief
based on specific and articulable facts that Dickerson was engaged in criminal
activity and that he might be armed and dangerous. Id. at 465.
26. Id. at 466.
27. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992).
28. See id. at 845-46. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected an analogy to
the "plain view" doctrine on two grounds. First, its belief that "the sense of
touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight," and
second, "the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 845.
29. Id. at 844.
30. See id. at 843-44. The Court concluded that the officer determined that
the lump was contraband only after "squeezing, sliding and otherwise
manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket" - a pocket which the
officer already knew did not contain a weapon. Id. at 844.
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overstepped the "strictly circumscribed" bounds of Terry3 1 because
the officer determined the lump was contraband only after
"squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of
the defendant's pocket."32 The Court, however, went on to hold
that if an officer conducts a lawful "pat down" of a suspect's outer
clothing, within the bounds of Terry,3 and detects through the
sense of touch an object whose contour and mass make its identity
immediately apparent, there is no invasion of the person's privacy
beyond that which was already authorized by Terry in a protective
"pat down" search for weapons.34
BACKGROUND
A. The Limits of the Terry Frisk
In Terry v. Ohio,35 the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but the Court determined the Amendment
permitted a stop and frisk of a suspect by police officers. 36 To jus-
tify an investigatory stop the officer must have a reasonable suspi-
cion that "criminal activity may be afoot."37 During a Terry stop,
the police are further allowed to "seize" the suspect long enough to
conduct a cursory "pat down" search of the suspect's outer clothing
in an effort to discover weapons.3 Yet, the officer may only con-
duct this search if he has reasonable suspicion based on specific
and articulable facts that the suspect is presently armed and dan-
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); see also United States v. Pajari, 715
F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing limited patdown search based on
reasonable suspicion when suspect appears nervous while leaving house and in
car, and appears to reach for weapon).
32. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844.
33. 392 U.S. at 27.
34. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); cf. Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (claim of privacy lost once certain to contain
illicit drugs).
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36. Id. at 23-27. The Court defines a stop and frisk as an interference with a
person's liberty, short of a full arrest, where a police officer reasonably suspects a
person is involved in criminal conduct and is armed. Id. at 30-31.
37. Id. at 30; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) ("[Tlhe Court
•.. acknowledge[s] the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person
when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.").
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
1994]
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gerous.39 To determine .whether a police officer acted reasonably
in a Terry context, the Court noted "due weight must be given to
the specific and reasonable inferences an officer is reasonably
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience,40 and not
to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicions or 'hunch.' "41
In Terry, Chief Justice Warren developed a bright line test,
drawing a distinction between a limited "pat down" search or
frisk, and a more intrusive, full search of the person. A protective
search, permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reason-
able suspicion,42 something less than probable cause, must be
strictly "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby
39. Id. at 23-24 (when the officer believes an individual is armed and
presently dangerous, it would be "unreasonable to deny the officer the power to
take necessary measures... to neutralize the threat of physical harm.").
40. The test is an objective rather than a subjective one and thus it is not
essential that the officer actually have been in fear. Id. at 21-22. As stated in
United States v. Tharpe:
We know of no legal requirement that a policeman must feel "scared" by
the threat of danger. Evidence that the officer was aware of sufficient
specific facts as would suggest he was in danger satisfies the
constitutional requirement. Terry cannot be read to condemn a pat-
down search because it was made by an inarticulate policeman whose
inartful courtroom testimony is embellished with assertions of bravado,
so long as it is clear that he was aware of specific facts which would
warrant a reasonable person to believe he was in danger. Under the
familiar standard of the reasonable prudent man, no purpose related to
the protective function of the Terry rule would be served by insisting on
the retrospective incantation "I was scared."
536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1387
(9th Cir. 1987), where the court noted:
[W]e recognize that effective law enforcement is often predicated on
hunches developed from a police officer's years of experience in detecting
criminal activity. However, underlying every [F]ourth [A]mendment
analysis is a balancing between two competing concerns - society's
interest in effective law enforcement and the individual's privacy and
liberty interests. A [F]ourth [A]mendment stop [and search] based on
hunches alone will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
See also United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990)
("[I]nvestigative stops are invalid if they are solely based upon unparticular
suspicion or unarticulable hunches. . .
42. Reasonable suspicion requires "specific articulable facts which, taken with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the belief a crime is
being or has been committed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
262 [Vol. 16:257
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... "43 Thus, seizure is not permitted where the object felt during
the course of the search is soft in nature.44 Also, if the protective
"pat down" search goes beyond what is needed to determine
whether the suspect is armed, the search is not valid under Terry,
and its fruits will be suppressed.45 The Supreme Court has stated
"the narrow intrusions involved in [Terry and its progeny] were
judged by a balancing test rather than by the general principle
that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the 'long-
prevailing standards' of probable cause, ... only because these
43. Id. at 26; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979). The following Supreme Court cases indicate
that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police
have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between suspects and police are especially hazardous, and that
danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding
a suspect: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (police may order
persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may frisk
those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they are armed and
dangerous - decision rested in part on "the inordinate risk confronting an
officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile"); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (police officer, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into
the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a driver's
waistband even where the gun was not apparent to police from outside the car
and the police knew of its existence only because of the tip - again the Court's
decision rested in part on the danger presented to police officer's in traffic stop
situations).
44. Id. at 29 (search confined to discovery of "guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the officer"). Accord State v. Collins, 679
P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (officer may seize only weapons during "stop and
frisk" weapons search, not any and all suspicious items discovered); People v.
Collins, 463 P.2d 403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (officer's "fanciful speculation" that soft
object might be atypical weapon must be supported by reasons why that detainee
would be so armed and why that object feels like an atypical weapon); People v.
McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (officer had no right to seize a
soft plastic bag from defendant's coat pocket, after determining pocket did not
contain a weapon); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990)
(officer may not seize object felt during patdown search unless it reasonably
resembles a weapon); State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (Wash. 1980) (patdown
search for weapons, but included an exploration the defendant might be in
possession of narcotics because of a prior arrest).
45. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968); see, e.g., Smith v. Ohio,
494 U.S. 541, 542-43 (1990); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th
Cir. 1979); People v. Pritchett, 393 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); People
v. Brockington, 574 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (App. Div. 1991); Lippert v. State, 664
S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Leake v. Commonwealth, 265 S.E.2d
701, 704 (Va. 1980).
1994] 263
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intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an
arrest."
46
In a companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 4 7 the
Supreme Court emphasized the limited nature of a protective
search by reversing a heroin possession conviction. The Court
held, pursuant to Terry, a search of the suspect's pocket was
unlawful because the officer was looking for narcotics, not weap-
ons.4 8 Because the search conducted by the officer was so clearly
unrelated to the officer's right to frisk for weapons, the search
could not stand.49 Reading Terry and Sibron together evidences
the Supreme Court's desire to limit pat searches to a careful explo-
ration of outer surfaces of the suspect's clothing.
B. The "Plain Feel" Analogy to "Plain View"
Several federal circuit courts and state appellate courts have
applied a "plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment,
describing it as an extension of the "plain view" doctrine.5 ° The
"plain view" doctrine provides for the warrantless search and
seizure of any contraband found in plain view if: (1) the law
enforcement officers have legitimately entered a constitutionally
protected area,51 either by a warrant or an exception to the war-
rant requirement; (2) probable cause exists to associate the con-
traband with criminal conduct; and (3) the contraband's criminal
nature is immediately apparent.5 2 If the incriminating nature of
the object is not immediately apparent, no probable cause to
believe it is contraband exists, and therefore its seizure cannot be
46. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). Hornbook law has been
that "the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral
magistrate that there is probable cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 457 (1981).
47. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
48. Id. at 62.
49. Id. at 62-65.
50. See supra note 4 (collecting cases).
51. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (fourth
amendment rights violated by unauthorized physical penetration into
petitioner's home.). As the majority in Olmstead v. United States concluded:
The Fourth Amendment... [has not] been violated ... unless there has
been an official search and seizure of [the] person, or such a seizure of
his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion
of his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
52. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
264 [Vol. 16:257
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justified under the "plain view" doctrine.53 As a result, the evi-
dence is suppressed.
5 4
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Ocampo,55 became
the first appellate court to apply the "plain feel" exception. The
court reasoned "[w]here the contents of a container are easily dis-
cernible by frisking the exterior of a package, there is little likeli-
hood that the owner could reasonably expect any substantial
degree of privacy. "56 However, not all states have adopted the
"plain feel" doctrine.57 For instance, the following year, in United
States v. Ross,58 a plurality of the Court rejected the Ocampo
court's distinction between containers. In Ross, the Court
expressly noted it would not base the "plain feel" exception upon
the difference between sturdy containers (the inside of which con-
tents cannot be felt) and flimsy containers (the inside of which
contents can be felt).59
Prior to Dickerson, other courts have acknowledged a plain
feel exception by analogizing it to the plain view exception.6 °
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1438 (10th Cir. 1991)
(because "[t]he 'incriminating character' of the contents of a closed, opaque,
innocuously shaped container, such as a camera lens case, is not 'immediately
apparent,'" court rejected application of "plain view" exception); United States v.
Beal, 810 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming suppression of "pen guns"
where their incriminating nature was neither "immediate" nor "apparent");
Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1984) (approving suppression
of plastic bag containing drug paraphernalia seized after officers had observed
only a corner of the bag; court found that "[t]here is nothing apparently
incriminating about a plastic bag"); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 269-70
(4th Cir. 1984) (weapons underneath opaque blanket not immediately apparent);
United States v. Szymkowiak, 727 F.2d 95, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1984) (criminal
activity was neither "immediate" nor "apparent" from discovery of firearm).
55. 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 429.
57. See supra note 4.
58. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
59. Id. at 822. The Court explained:
[A] constitutional distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy"
containers would be improper .... For just as the most frail cottage in
the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as
the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a
toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as
the sophisticated executive with the locked attache case.
Id.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1994] 265
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These cases, which draw a connection between the "plain feel" doc-
trine and the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment,
set the stage for the Court's decision in Dickerson, adopting the
"plain feel" exception to cover situations where nonlethal contra-
band is detected during the course of a legitimate Terry frisk.
ANALYsis
A. Supreme Court's Extension of Terry Frisk
1. Weakening of the Fourth Amendment
Minnesota v. Dickerson6' is the first Supreme Court case
broadening the Fourth Amendment limitations on warrantless
searches and seizures established in Terry. The basic policy
behind the Terry frisk is to allow police officers to investigate sus-
pected criminal conduct without having to fear for their safety.61
Even though this search involves a significant intrusion of per-
sonal liberty,63 the need to locate hidden weapons which a suspect
could use against the officer permits a thorough patdown.
It has long been fundamental that warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the
acknowledged exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. 4 Prior to the Court's ruling in Dickerson, the gen-
eral rule provided that once an officer has concluded that no
1975 (1992); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1181-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820
(1983).
61. 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993).
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968); see id. at 33 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihere is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly
confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one
question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.").
63. Id. at 17. The Court described the intrusion in this way:
Consider the following apt description: '[Tihe officer must feel with
sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search
must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back,
and the groin and area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the
legs down to the feet.'
Id. at 17 n. 13 (citation omitted).
64. See e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search incident to
lawful arrest); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (consent); Roaden
v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) (exigent circumstances); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (evidence in plain view); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
10
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weapon is present, the search is over and there is no authority for
further intrusion.65 The Court in Adams v. Williams66 advanced
this position by noting a policeman must limit a "pat down" to
what is necessary only to protect the police and others nearby and
must not use the "pat down" to further search for evidence.67 In
analyzing the reasonableness of police conduct, the Terry Court
balanced the need of the police to perform a search against the
privacy interests of the person being searched.68 The Court deter-
mined the police conduct in Terry was reasonable because the
police interest in safety during the course of investigating crimi-
nal activity outweighed the brief, but severe, intrusion of personal
privacy.6 9
According to the Court in Michigan v. Long,7 ° when police
officers conduct a Terry search of the inside of an automobile, they
must limit the search to areas where weapons could be hidden.7 '
The Court further explained that if the conduct of a legitimate
Terry search of the inside of an automobile revealed evidence
other than weapons, the police do not have to simply overlook the
evidence.72 However, the Court based its justification upon the
"plain view" doctrine, where the evidence is seen, not simply
revealed by the sense of touch.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in this case reveals
the difficulties contained in the Supreme Court's decision. The
state court rejected the "plain feel" exception, first, on the ground
that "the sense of touch is inherently less reliable than the sense
of sight", and second, "that the sense of touch is far more intrusive
into the personal privacy that is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
(exigent circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile exception).
65. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.4(c) at 524 (2d ed. 1987).
66. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
67. Id. at 146; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968) (to be
valid, a protective search under Terry can go no further that what is necessary to
determine if the suspect has a weapon).
68. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
69. Id. at 24-25 (noting justification for a Terry stop and frisk must be judged
according to whether the police acted as a reasonable, prudent man in the
situation would).
70. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
71. Id. at 1049.
72. Id. at 1050.
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ment."v3 The United States Supreme Court attempts to defuse
this reasoning by reliance on Terry itself. The Court expressed
that Terry supports the reliability of the sense of touch in police
conduct.7 ' This reasoning is flawed, as a weapon, especially a
gun, is something that one can easily recognize by the sense of
touch.7 - The Court disposes of the Minnesota Court's second con-
cern by stating the limited search for weapons authorized by
Terry already sanctions the intrusion into personal privacy.76
This reasoning ignores the fact the limited search allowed by
Terry is solely for the protection of the police and others who may
be nearby. Under Terry, this safety interest outweighs any inva-
sion of personal privacy. 7 Yet, in Dickerson, the Court fails to
acknowledge any interest which would outweigh such invasion.
The result of the Dickerson decision is a circumvention of
established precedent by extending the recognized "plain view"
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to jus-
tify the search and seizure of contraband. Very clearly, the
Supreme Court cannot justify its position under the Terry ration-
ale78 or its progeny. 9
B. Blurring of Bright-Line Terry Rule
Terry sets a clearly defined line justifying a limited protective
search only where the police officer considers the suspect armed
and dangerous."0 As a result, police officers and courts know that
73. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992).
74. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137-38 (1993) ("The very
premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence of
weapons through the sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure.").
75. E.g., United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980) (handgun in
paper bag); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822 (Haw. 1984) (handgun in knapsack).
76. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137-38; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1060 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nothing in Terry justifies a cursory search
of an automobile; "[t]he Court flouts Terry's holding that Terry searches must be
carefully limited in scope.").
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
78. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
79. See Pennslyvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (in conducting
an investigatory detention of an individual in a motor vehicle, the officer may
frisk the individual for weapons if the officer has formed a reasonable belief that
the person is armed and dangerous); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)
(when the justification for conducting a search is the protection of the officer, s/he
must be able to point to particular facts from which it may be inferred that the
individual was "armed and dangerous").
80. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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a search for contraband during a Terry stop and frisk is unlaw-
ful."' The Supreme Court's decision changes this clear-cut rule
dramatically. Now, police officers have the burden of making
quick, affirmative judgments as to what they feel underneath a
person's outer garments. At the same time, courts will bear a fur-
ther burden to determine when the nature of a small, unremark-
able object is or was "immediately apparent" to the police officer.8 2
Further, the Court jeopardizes the effective Terry bright-line
rule based on claimed police efficiency.8 3 The Court has previ-
ously recognized the need to prevent the destruction of evidence or
the unlawful use of contraband is an insuffidient justification to
permit the feeling of a person's body without the judicial authori-
zation of a warrant or facts sufficient to establish probable cause
to place the individual under arrest.8 4 Even where the efficiency
of law enforcement is enhanced, the Court has often emphasized
that this enhancement simply cannot justify unconstitutional
police procedures.8 5  By replacing the bright-line rule of Terry
with an undefined "plain feel" exception, the Court inevitably per-
mits police officers to conduct full-blown searches.
81. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (drugs
discovered during weapons frisk suppressed). But see Colding v. State, 536
S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ark. 1976) (drugs found during patdown admissible).
82. See United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1986) (avoiding
heavy burden of plain feel application by finding that plain view was properly
applied since officer knew that a case contained burglar tools before he felt it).
83. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (tactile discoveries of
contraband are justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate
would often be impracticable); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467-68, 469-70 (1971) (Stewart, J.).
84. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970).
85. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987). For courts rejecting a "plain feel" exception
despite the possibility of improved efficiency, see State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80,
81-82, 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (noting where the "state appears to claim a 'plain
feel' exception to the Fourth Amendment," court invalidated a search and seizure
in which officer "felt 'soft' objects which were obviously not weapons.");
Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992) (rejecting a "plain touch" exception by noting
that "we can not lose sight of the fact that this began as a Terry frisk. Once the
officer was satisfied that Marconi was not armed and dangerous, the inquiry
should have ended.").
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C. The Court's Analogy To Plain View
1. Plain Feel is not Immediately Apparent
In addition to Terry, the Court relies heavily on the "plain
view" doctrine to justify its holding. The rationale behind this doc-
trine is that where apparent contraband is left in plain view and is
observed by law enforcement officers from a place they have a
right to be, there is no search for Fourth Amendment purposes
beyond that already authorized.8 6 In Texas v. Brown, 7 the Court
stated where evidence reveals itself in a "plain view" context, no
Fourth Amendment purpose is promoted by requiring police
officers to visit a magistrate for a warrant to seize the evidence.88
Based on this doctrine, the Dickerson Court justifies the warrant-
less seizure of contraband discovered through the sense touch dur-
ing a lawful patdown search, when the object's contour and mass
makes its identity immediately apparent as contraband.8 9
While a police officer can generally determine immediately
whether an item in plain view is contraband, an officer conducting
a "pat down" in most cases cannot be so sure,90 particularly when
the item is an especially small one that is never seen and only felt
through an outer garment.91 Moreover, the essential conditions
which justify a "plain view" exception to the warrant require-
ment 92 cannot justify an exception for plain feel searches. 93 The
touching of an object whose identity is concealed by a covering
86. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1990); Illinois v. Andreas, 463
U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
87. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
88. Id. at 740.
89. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
90. For cases in which easily-distinguishable facts show that the police knew,
to a reasonable certainty, what was in the containers after lawfully feeling them
from the outside, see United States v. Russel, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(handgun in paper bag); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981)
(paper bags with bundles of currency overflowing both seen and felt); United
States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980) (handgun in paper bag); People v.
Chavers, 658 P.2d 96 (Cal. 1983) (handgun in shaving kit); State v. Ortiz, 683
P.2d 822 (Haw. 1984) (handgun in knapsack).
91. See Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
("[W]hen an individual feels an object through a pants pocket, . . . the sense of
touch is not so definitive. The structure and shape of a small packet is not
unique so as to preclude other options as to what that item might be."), appeal
denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash.
1982) (en banc) ("The tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate
knowledge of the nature of the item.").
92. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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cannot conclusively establish an object's identity or criminal
nature.s4 Knowledge concerning an object by merely feeling it
through an exterior covering is necessarily based on the police
officer's expert opinion. However, the Court rejected this type of
knowledge in earlier decisions.95
Likewise troubling is the fact that even if the intrusion inher-
ent in the initial act of touch is constitutional, the discovery and
seizure of the items entails even a further intrusion. Conducting
this second search reveals the nature of the object is not "immedi-
ately apparent" within the meaning of the "plain view" rule.9 6
2. Personal Privacy Intrusions
The theory underlying the justification for the plain view
exception cannot logically be extended to concealed items which
are discoverable only through the sense of touch. 97 In its tradi-
tional context, the "plain view" doctrine is associated with
seizures, not searches. 98 Unlike the "plain view" doctrine, under
which the owner has no privacy expectation,9 9 the owner of a con-
cealed item retains a legitimate expectation that the item's exist-
ence and characteristics will remain unrevealed. 100 The identity
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d at 623, n. 17 (sense of touch
"is not so definitive as the recognition of certain sounds, smells or tastes."),
appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992); United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 195
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (plain feel does not permit "police officers to eviscerate the
[F]ourth [Almendment by performing warrantless searches one layer at a time.");
State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992) (touching is inherently less
reliable).
94. See, e.g., State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (1982) ("[T]actile sense does
not usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature of the item."); State
v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 481 N.W.2d 840
(Minn. 1992).
95. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted).
96. Cf Arizona V. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (movement of stereo in
plain view to record serial numbers was a second, impermissible search; one
which "is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.").
97. See United States v. Martin, No. 90-6318, 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 19740, at
19747 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 1991) ("[Pllain.view" is not "a talisman that the police
can invoke in order to ward off any constitutional scrutiny[,]... nor does it
"justify a cascading series of intrusions.").
98. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
100. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (holding Fourth
Amendment protects owner of every container that conceals contents from
public view); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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and criminal nature of a concealed object are not likely to be dis-
cernible upon mere touch or patdown within the scope of the
intrusion authorized by Terry, especially when the person makes
a conscious effort to place the object in a container. 10 1 Conversely,
when an item is in plain view its identity and criminal nature are
discernible upon sight and thus no justification for a search is
required. 102
Further, a police officer's determination the object touched is
some sort of contraband will, in many situations, require some
degree of pinching, squeezing or probing beyond the limited intru-
sion allowed under Terry.10 3 The proposed "plain feel" exception
could ultimately invite circumvention of the Terry limits and
thereby allow warrantless searches in violation of an individual's
expectation of privacy.1 0 4  Such violation would be inevitable
under a doctrine that would tolerate warrantless touching and
feeling of objects hidden in a person's clothing beyond the limited
scope of a Terry frisk for weapons. 10 5
D. Result Of The Court's Decision
Although the requirements of the Fourth Amendment inevi-
tably make police work less efficient, the framer's of the Fourth
Amendment found those requirements necessary to prevent
abuses of the power held by police officers.106 Though Terry
addressed both safety concerns (the frisk) and efficiency concerns
101. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 ("By placing personal effects inside a double-
locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents
would remain free from public examination.").
102. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
103. See David L. Haselkorn, Comment, The Case Against a Plain Feel
Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 683, 695-96 (1983).
104. See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (arguing a "plain
touch" exception would "invite the use of weapons' searches as a pretext for
unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.") (citing State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429, 433-34 (Wash. 1980)).
105. Id.
106. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1960). Also, in a frequently
quoted dissent, Justice Brandeis explained:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of a man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
[Vol. 16:257272
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(the stop), the Court noted that the "stop and frisk" power given to
the police was grounded entirely upon a safety rationale.
10 7
Because the power to frisk is grounded in a safety rationale, the
governing principle in deciding the scope of the frisk power should
be whether police face a reasonable fear of danger and not any
notions of criminal culpability of the person being frisked. 108
The Dickerson Court held the frisk of the defendant went
beyond the scope of Terry because the officers had to pinch and
manipulate the defendant's pocket in order to discern what the
pocket contained. 10 9 However, the Court notes that had this
manipulation not have occurred and the officers knew upon touch
that what they were feeling was crack cocaine, the search would
have been valid under the "plain feel" exception." 0 In other
words, police officers may not manipulate an object, which they
have previously determined not to be a weapon, in order to ascer-
tain its incriminating nature. What the Court in effect does is tell
police officers what must be done in order to make evidence
admissible under the "plain feel" exception. Further, the evalua-
tion of whether an item of contraband became "immediately
apparent" to police officers may be so prejudiced by the results of
the search as to motivate the court to look for post hoc justifica-
tions for an ultimately successful search which was not reasonable
at its inception."' As stated by Justice Scalia in his concurrence
in this case, "as a policy matter, it may be desirable to permit
'frisks' for weapons, but not to encourage 'frisks' for drugs by
admitting evidence other than weapons." 112
against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the rights most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
107. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
108. Several members of the Court have recognized the propensity of police to
exploit criminal procedure loopholes to their fullest extent. See, e.g., Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 451 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that to
obtain full search incident to arrest powers, officers may be prompted to make a
full custody arrest after stopping an automobile for a traffic violation if they see
an "interesting looking" item in the automobile).
109. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993).
110. Id.
111. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) ("[T]he [Fourth]
Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police
action.")
112. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2141.
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CONCLUSION
The Dickerson Court held police officers may seize non-threat-
ening contraband immediately perceived to be such, during a pro-
tective Terry search. In reaching its decision, the Court adopted a
"plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment by drawing an analogy to the previously defined "plain view"
doctrine. However, because the essential conditions which justify
the "plain view" doctrine are lacking under the "plain feel" excep-
tion, police officers are forced to engaged in further intrusions in
order to discover the identity of an item they are feeling.
While an item of contraband is immediately apparent upon
sight, the possibility of the sense of touch revealing an object as
contraband is highly remote. In most cases, the only way a police
officer will know an item is contraband, while feeling it through a
suspect's outer clothing, is by manipulating and probing beyond
the well-defined parameters of Terry. Further, this decision
tempts police officers to go beyond traditional Fourth Amendment
principles in order to discover evidence. In effect, the Court arms
police officers with the necessary ammunition to convince a court
that evidence of an ultimately successful search, which was not
reasonable at its inception, should be admitted at trial under the
"plain feel" exception. The result is a weakening of Fourth
Amendment guarantees and an invasion of the public's right to be
secure in their person.
Nicole J. Lehmann
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